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Abstract 
 
A crucial question for anyone willing to defend a process view of the biological world is how 
to identify a process and how to follow it through time. Here I suggest that the “genidentity” 
view (suggested first by psychologist Kurt Lewin, and then further explored by philosopher 
Hans Reichenbach, mainly in the context of physics) can contribute decisively to this project. 
According to the genidentity view, the identity through time of an entity X is nothing more 
than the continuous connection of the states through which X goes. In this paper, I explain 
how the genidentity view addresses the long debated problem of what constitutes diachronic 
identity in the biological world. I describe the centrality of the concept of genidentity in David 
Hull’s reflection on biological identity, and I then suggest an extension of Hull’s view on the 
basis of recent data demonstrating the ubiquity of symbiotic interactions in the living world. 
Finally, using immunological interactions as a key example, I show that the genidentity view 
sheds light on process biology by suggesting that the main interest of a process approach is 
epistemological rather than ontological, and that the main claim of a process approach is one 
of priority, that is, the claim that processes precede and define things, and not vice versa. 
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0. Introduction 
 
What exactly is a process view of life? Philosophers of biology and biologists who have 
recently defended such a view ((Dupré, 2012); (Bapteste & Dupré, 2013); (Dupré, 2014)) 
generally oppose processes (characterized by constant change) and things (characterized by 
stability and durability). But two major questions should be raised regarding this view:  
(i) What kinds of relationships between ‘things’ and “processes’ are possible? Is it 
possible to countenance both ‘things’ and ‘processes’ as categories to describe the living 
world, or are these two categories incompatible?  
(ii) Can a priority claim about ‘things’ and ‘processes’ be made and, if so, on which 
ground? Here the question is to determine what comes first – things or processes. Two main 
types of priority claims can be made: an ontological one (the biological world is actually 
made of processes, and things are only partial and temporary stabilizations of processes), or 
an epistemological perspective (the best way to understand the biological world for us, as 
human beings, is to get access to it in terms of processes). (On processes in general, and on 
the opposition between processes and substances, see (Seibt, 2013), as well as Seibt, this 
volume). 
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 In this chapter, I would like to show that a preexisting view of the biological world, 
called the “genidentity view,” especially in the variant defended by David Hull, helps clarify 
what a process view of life might be. More specifically, the genidentity view is useful because 
it suggests that: a) both the notions of processes and things are needed in biology, but 
processes are prior to things; b) the main interest of adopting a process view is 
epistemological, not ontological. One key underlying objective of the present chapter will be 
to address a question that seems decisive for anyone who proposes to conceive of the 
biological world in terms of processes, namely “What difference does it make, in actual 
practice, to adopt a process view?” 
Let us start with a preliminary definition of the notion of “genidentity.” In a nutshell, 
the genidentity view, which has been explored in the contexts of psychology, physics, and 
biology ((Lewin, 1922), (Reichenbach, 1956), (Hull, 1992); (Boniolo & Carrara, 2004); 
(Pradeu & Carosella, 2006b); (Guay & Pradeu, 2016b)), says that the identity through time of 
an entity X is given by a well-identified series of continuous states of affairs. Of course, this 
claim is not sufficient in itself; every precise application of the genidentity view requires a 
clarification of exactly which continuous states are being followed, and why. In what follows, 
I examine in detail the concept of genidentity, and then I show why it could constitute a 
decisive building block for the project of developing a process view for biology. After a short 
reminder about the origins of the concept of genidentity, I describe its centrality in David 
Hull’s reflection on biological identity, and I then suggest an extension of Hull’s view on the 
basis of recent data demonstrating the ubiquity of symbiotic interactions in the living world. 
Finally, I explain why genidentity leads us to adopt a multilevel and mainly epistemological 
view on biological processes. 
 
 
1. What is genidentity, and how can this concept be applied to the living world? 
 
What constitutes the identity through time of an entity X? For instance, in what sense can I be 
said to be the “same” as the child I was, a cat the “same” as the kitten it was, or a wave the 
“same” wave while it is moving through the sea? Those questions are particular instances of 
the more general problem of diachronic identity (or identity through time), undoubtedly one 
of the most fundamental and most debated problems of all philosophy. That problem has been 
raised by major philosophers of the past, including Aristotle, Locke, and Leibniz, among 
many others. More recently, metaphysicians (both “perdurantists” and “endurantists”) have 
offered important analyses of the same problem, e.g., David Wiggins (2001), Peter van 
Inwagen (1990), Theodore Sider (2001), and Katherine Hawley (2004). 
 One very interesting, though often neglected, way to address the problem of 
diachronic identity is to resort to the concept of “genidentity,” suggested by psychologist Kurt 
Lewin, and then further explored by philosopher of science Hans Reichenbach. What is 
genidentity? According to the genidentity view, the identity through time of an entity X is 
given by a well-identified series of continuous states of affairs. As will become clear in what 
follows, this view insists on continuity of states rather than prior existence of objects, it 
conflicts radically with several forms of substantialism, and it is based on an epistemological 
(rather than ontological) attitude regarding science. 
 The concept of “genidentity” was proposed in 1922 by Kurt Lewin (1890-1947), a 
leading German-American psychologist, as a way to better understand identity through time 
(Lewin, 1922). The concept of genidentity has been neglected by most philosophers of 
science, but it was taken very seriously by Hans Reichenbach (1891-1953). Indeed, 
Reichenbach examined different conceptions of genidentity, and applied them to several 
physical cases (Reichenbach, 1956) (on the different versions of the genidentity concept for 
 3 
Reichenbach, see (Padovani, 2013) and (Guay & Pradeu, 2016b)). Today, however, the notion 
of genidentity is rarely used in philosophy in general, and almost never used in philosophy of 
science (with some rare exceptions, e.g., (Hull, 1992); (Boniolo & Carrara, 2004); (Pradeu & 
Carosella, 2006b); (Guay & Pradeu, 2016b)). 
 By insisting on defining identity as a mere continuity, the concept of genidentity 
echoes in part John Locke’s conception of identity. Indeed, in the second edition of his Essay, 
Locke (Locke, 1975 [1694]) says that the long-sought “principle of individuation” is to be 
found in a simple continuity of states. In the case of living things (plants or animals), the 
identity of a being is, according to Locke, the continuity of one and the same “life.” This 
illustrates what has been said above, namely that genidentity views always need to make clear 
exactly which states are followed, and why (here, the continuity of a “life”). Applied to 
humans, Locke’s view is the following: 
 
This also shows wherein the Identity of the same Man consists; viz. in nothing but a participation of the 
same continued Life, by constantly fleeting Particles of Matter, in succession vitally united to the same 
organized Body. (Locke 1975 [1694], §6, 331). 
  
Interestingly, in his New Essays, which constitute a systematic response to Locke’s Essay, 
Leibniz (Leibniz, 1916 [1765]) strongly rejects Locke’s conception of identity because, for 
Leibniz, continuity by itself is insufficient to define identity: 
 
By itself continuity no more constitutes substance than does multitude or number . . . Something is 
necessary to be numbered, repeated and continued (Leibniz 1916 [1765], 169). 
 
Let us call substantialism the view according to which the identity of a thing X must be 
understood as the identity of a substance identified beforehand, and continuism the view 
according to which the identity of a thing X is given by a mere continuity of states (as 
defended by Locke). Substantialism is defended by Leibniz, but also by many contemporary 
philosophers, under different forms. One version of substantialism is essentialism, which 
states that what makes the identity of X through time is that a core constituent or 
characteristic of X remains constant through time. For example, genetic essentialism says, in 
the case of living things, that a living thing remains the same through time in virtue of the fact 
that it possesses the same genome throughout (Kripke, 1980). Another, significantly different, 
version of substantialism is the “Neo-Aristotelian” view defended by David Wiggins 
(Wiggins, 2001). According to this view, the identity of a thing X is given by a sortal concept 
(a category), which defines a specific principle of activity (for example, it is possible to 
understand the identity of a given thing only by determining that it is, say, a dog, and that 
what defines the identity of a dog is a certain principle of activity, common to all dogs).  
  I suggest here that the genidentity view constitutes a particularly interesting and 
fruitful version of continuism (and, therefore, a view that stands in contrast with 
substantialism in general), and that it can shed light on the question of the diachronic identity 
of living things. More precisely, I would like to defend the view that genidentity is the best 
way to understand the diachronic identity of a living thing, and that it helps make the concept 
of biological process more precise. I first explain the centrality of the notion of genidentity in 
Hull’s thinking about the problem of individuality, and then how his view can be extended to 
reflect important findings in recent biology, in particular regarding the phenomenon of 
symbiosis. 
  
 
2. The inconspicuous centrality of genidentity in David Hull’s conception of biological 
individuality 
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David Hull (1935-2010) was undoubtedly one of the most influential philosophers of biology. 
Hull mentioned the notion of genidentity several times in his writings ((Hull, 1986); (Hull, 
1992)), but these mentions remained largely unnoticed, and, intriguingly, other philosophers 
of biology did not follow Hull and did not adopt this notion. 
 How does Hull apply the idea of genidentity more specifically? In other words, which 
states should one follow to understand the identity of a living thing? Hull’s answer is that one 
should follow the continuity of an internal organization. Let us try to explain this idea in 
more detail. 
Even before Hull used the notion of genidentity explicitly, the idea behind that notion 
was already present in his writings. In particular, the idea of genidentity underlies his view of 
identity presented in one of his most famous and influential texts, “A Matter of Individuality” 
(Hull, 1978). This paper by Hull is often seen as a defense of two theses, namely that species 
are individuals rather than classes, and that there is no “human nature,” no “essence” of 
humanity (indeed, if humans are considered from the species point of view, that is, as Homo 
sapiens, it is impossible to define what are the necessary and sufficient characteristics that 
would make a given entity a human). Nevertheless, what in fact constitutes the basis of these 
two theses is the conception of identity defended by Hull, a conception that is also at the heart 
of what is arguably the most important contribution of that paper, that is, the two diagrams 
drawn by Hull. Let us now see what exactly is the conception of identity held by Hull, and 
why it can be important for our argumentation. 
  The starting point of Hull is that, at least since Aristotle, most philosophers have had a 
naïve view of biological individuality. Indeed, philosophers often use fictitious examples and, 
when they speak of a living thing, they generally mean in fact an animal, and even, in most 
cases, a higher vertebrate (a horse, a cat, etc.). In contrast, Hull insists on the importance of 
examples that are both more realistic and more diverse. According to Hull, these examples are 
more fascinating, more complex, and in the end more challenging, than the fictitious 
examples and thought experiments favored by metaphysicians (the same idea is developed in 
(Hull, 2001)). Taking into account the actual diversity of the living world also implies, for 
Hull, a suspicion towards conceptions of biological individuality based on common sense and 
intuitive perception. Indeed, commonsense individuation is too strongly biased by our relative 
size and perception abilities ((Hull, 1978); (Hull, 1992)). For example, when dealing with 
many plants, colonial animals, fungi, microbes, etc., common sense individuation is helpless. 
Some cases have been much discussed in the biological and the philosophical literature, for 
example dandelions, aspens, social insects, ascidians, siphonophores, biofilms, etc. (on these 
examples, see for instance (Pradeu, 2012); (Bouchard & Huneman, 2013); (Guay & Pradeu, 
2016a)). 
In contrast to common sense and intuitive perception, Hull seeks to offer a biologically 
precise criterion for the diachronic identity of biological individuals, and he finds this 
criterion in the idea of continuity of change. According to Hull, organisms and species belong 
to the same ontological category, as both must be understood as spatiotemporally localized 
entities. More radically, Hull’s thesis is that any organism/any species is a portion of space 
and time. Every organism has a starting point and an end, and goes through different but 
continuous states between these two extremes. Exactly the same is true of every species. For 
Hull, because living things can undergo massive and unpredictable change, retention of 
substance (the idea that something of X remains through time) and resemblance (the idea that 
X looks sufficiently like itself) are useless criteria for biological diachronic identity, and the 
only satisfying criterion is continuity of change. 
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To describe and defend this continuity-based conception of identity, Hull explicitly 
endorses the notion of “genidentity” in several texts, and he grounds it in the idea of a 
continuous internal organization: 
 
Three traditional criteria for individuality in material bodies are retention of substance, retention of 
structure, and continuous existence through time (genidentity). If organisms are to count as individuals, 
then the first two criteria are much too restrictive. In point of fact, many organisms totally exchange 
their substance several times over while they retain their individuality. Others undergo massive 
metamorphosis as well, changing their structure markedly. If organisms are paradigm individuals, then 
retention of neither substance nor structure is either necessary or sufficient for continued identity in 
material bodies. The idea that comes closest to capturing individuality in organisms and possibly 
individuals as such is genidentity. As its name implies, this criterion allows for change just as long as it 
is sufficiently continuous. The overall organization of any entity can change but it cannot be disrupted 
too abruptly. (Hull, 1992). 
  
But this is already the very same conception of identity that underlies Hull’s (1978) 
fundamental diagrams (see Figures 1 and 2). These two figures offer a description of 
structural patterns of change in the living world, equally applicable to organisms and species. 
 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Ontogenetic change and splitting giving rise to the production of new organisms (in the case of 
organisms), or phylogenetic change and splitting leading to speciation (in the case of species) 
Based on Hull 1978. 
 
Figure 1 illustrates structural changes associated either with change of a living entity, or with 
its splitting into two living entities. For Hull, a new entity emerges from a given entity if and 
only if the internal organization of the original entity is strongly disrupted1. This criterion of 
disruption of internal organization is not always easy to apply, and by definition the observer 
often faces a continuum of possible situations, but the examples given by Hull are very 
helpful. A living entity remains the same (case 1a) even if it undergoes a limited change, or 
even a radical change, provided that the continuity between these different states can be 
established (e.g., a caterpillar becoming a butterfly). In contrast, the phenomenon of splitting 
(case 1b) is characterized by a disruption of internal organization: one individual becomes 
two individuals, and the initial individual disappears as such. Transverse fission in paramecia 
is an example. In other situations, an individual appears on another, preexisting, individual, 
with the new individual becoming progressively autonomous (case 1c). An example is 
strobilization in certain forms of Scyphozoa (sometimes colloquially called “true jellyfish”). 
In still other cases, a small part of an individual (contrary to case 1c, this is a part of an 
individual, not a growing individual on an individual) gains independence and becomes itself 
                                               
1 “The relevant consideration is how much of the parent organism is lost and its internal organization disrupted” 
(Hull, 1978, p. 345) 
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a new individual (case 1d). An example is budding in Hydrozoa (Hydrozoa are Cnidaria that, 
at least for most of them, have both a polypoid and medusoid stage in their lifecycles). 
Though classifying all the diversity of real biological phenomena of change and splitting into 
these four cases would probably prove very difficult, what seems clear and useful is the 
criterion used by Hull, who asks systematically whether the overall organization of the entity 
under consideration is disrupted or not. (Importantly, there is transgenerational material 
continuity between a parents and its offspring, but they are characterized by two different 
internal organizations, and it is precisely this criterion that makes the difference between the 
continuity of one being and the continuity of several beings through reproduction). 
 
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Total or partial merging between organisms, or between species. Based on Hull 1978. 
 
 
Figure 2 describes the merging of two living entities, or of their parts. To distinguish 
among the different possible situations, it is here again the criterion of disruption of internal 
organization that is used by Hull. Two entities can fuse to become one single entity, and 
remain one entity for a significant period of time, so the two initial individuals are lost (case 
2a) (fusion in amoebas do not constitute an adequate illustration of this case, while the fusion 
of two germ cells does). In other situations (case 2b), a portion of a first individual becomes a 
portion of a second individual, the two individuals continue their existence, but both have 
changed (the first has lost a part, the second has gained a part). Blood transfusion or bacterial 
conjugation are good examples. In still other situations, a portion of a first individual and a 
portion of a second individual merge to form a third (new) individual, while the two initial 
individuals continue their existence (case 2c). Sexual reproduction is a good example. 
Applied to species rather than organisms, a good example of 2b is introgression, and a good 
example of 2c is speciation by polyploidy (a rather common event in plants, for instance).  
In conclusion, Hull endorsed the genidentity view. For him, what biologists can and must 
do to account for the continuously changing identity of any living thing is to follow its 
changes through time, keeping in mind that it remains the same only as long as its internal 
organization remains the same or changes progressively.  
Naturally, one immediate difficulty faced by Hull’s account of biological identity is to 
offer a precise definition of what “internal organization” (and its disruption) means. 
Suggestions to move towards that direction will be made in section 4, but, for now, I would 
like to show why recent biological data about symbiosis strengthen Hull’s line of argument. 
 
 
3. Why the case of symbiosis strengthens the genidentity view 
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As we have seen, Hull claims that, because living entities can change, merge, and split, it is 
crucial, in order to understand their diachronic individuality, to be able to actually follow 
them through time. But how frequent are events of merging and splitting in the living world? 
Though Hull mentions several important examples of fusion and splitting, symbiosis does not 
play an important role in his demonstration (apart from the rapid mention of the 
endosymbiotic event that is at the origin of some organelles). Now, research done on 
symbiosis in the last two decades or so shows that symbiotic events of fusion and splitting are 
much more frequent than had traditionally been assumed ((McFall-Ngai, 2002); (McFall-Ngai 
et al., 2013); (Gilbert & Epel, 2015)). In fact, we will see that the pervasiveness of symbiosis 
proves that Hull’s diagrams, which at first sight might seem to concern only a limited number 
of biological cases, describe situations that are in fact very frequent in nature. Indeed, by 
taking into account symbioses, one realizes that living things are massively like 2a (fusion) or 
2b (integration with continuation) or, even more frequently, “inverted 1c” (internalization) 
(see Figure 3), and that they can also split more often than is usually thought. 
 
[Insert Figure 3 about here] 
 
 
Figure 3. Forms of integration of external biological material, at the organism level or the species level. 
The first case corresponds to Hull’s 2a (fusion), the second to Hull’s 2b (integration with continuation), while 
the third case is an inversion of Hull’s 1c. The third case (absent in Hull’s analysis) can be called 
“internalization,” and is described in this chapter as an extremely frequent (though long overlooked) 
phenomenon in nature. 
 
 
  “Symbiosis” can be understood here in the very broad sense of any close and lasting 
interaction between two biological entities belonging to two different species. This is in 
accordance with the traditional definition of Anton de Bary, formulated in 1879 (see, e.g., 
Sapp, 1994). Adopting this extensive definition is important here, as it can cover cases that 
range from mutualism (in which the fitness of the two partners is increased by the 
interaction), to commensalism (a neutral interaction), and to parasitism (in which the fitness 
of one partner increases, while the fitness of the other decreases). Indeed, all these different 
cases exist among the recently documented examples of symbioses. 
 Important events of symbiotic fusions occur both at the level of organisms and at the 
level of species. At the level of organisms, symbioses, long thought to be rather rare, are now 
considered almost ubiquitous ((McFall-Ngai et al., 2013); (Gilbert & Epel, 2015)). Indeed, 
probably all organisms are hosts of many microorganisms, very often in close and long-
lasting associations. Very well documented cases include plants, hydra, cnidarians, sponges, 
fishes, the squid Euprymna scolopes, insects, mice, and humans ((Bosch & McFall-Ngai, 
2011); (Nyholm & McFall-Ngai, 2014)). There is often a co-construction of the host and the 
microbes, as illustrated by cases such as legume-Rhizobia (Oldroyd, 2013) or E. scolopes-
Vibrio (Nyholm & McFall-Ngai, 2004) interactions. In many cases, the association is 
beneficial to one of the partners, or to both. In particular, and perhaps counter-intuitively, it is 
frequently the case that interactions with some microbes shape and strengthen the host 
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immune system ((Pradeu & Carosella, 2006b); (Round & Mazmanian, 2009)). Very 
interesting cases include those where some microbes are indispensable for the development of 
the host ((McFall-Ngai, 2002); (Pradeu, 2011)). The notion of heterogeneous organism 
((Pradeu, 2010); (Pradeu, 2012)) captures this very broad idea that all known organisms seem 
to harbor huge quantities of biological entities belonging to other species, and that, in many of 
them, those biological entities become so integrated into the host that they can be considered 
as parts of it. Which of these cases will count as merging events, as described by Hull? The 
decision for each case will depend, here again, on the degree of disruption of internal 
organization. For example, the legume-Rhizobia symbiosis offers a clear case of merging, 
and, more precisely, of internalization (case 3c, which can also be called “inverted 1c”). The 
plant could live without the bacteria, but the recruitment of the bacteria at the root level helps 
the plant decisively (the rhizobia create ammonia from nitrogen in the air, which is used by 
the plant to create amino acids and nucleotides), and the bacteria are very significantly 
transformed during the process, differentiating into bacteroids. The association between the 
two partners eventually constitutes a unit that displays a high degree of internal organization. 
In contrast, the colonization of a host by a microbe (be it pathogenic, commensal, or 
mutualistic) which would not remain for long in the host, which would not be transformed by 
this interaction, and which in turn would not have a deep effect on the overall organization of 
the host, would not count as a case of merging. 
 Symbiotic events of merging also happen at the species level. A nice example is the 
Aphid-Buchnera (more precisely Acyrthosphion pisum-Buchnera aphidicola) obligate 
symbiotic association. Approximately 160-280 million years ago (Shigenobu & Wilson, 
2011), an aphid ancestor was infected with a free-living eubacterium, and this eubacterium 
became established within aphid cells. The host and the Buchnera endosymbiont became 
interdependent and unable to survive without each other. The growth of Buchnera became 
integrated with that of the aphids, which acquired the endosymbionts from their mothers 
before birth. Speciation of host lineages was paralleled by divergence of associated 
endosymbiont lineages, resulting in parallel evolution of Buchnera and aphids (Baumann et 
al., 1995). Today, the aphid-Buchnera association (almost all of 4,000 extant species of aphid 
harbor an obligate Buchnera symbiont) constitutes one of the best-documented cases of an 
obligate symbiosis, where none of the partners can survive and reproduce without the other 
(Shigenobu & Wilson, 2011). In such situations, the physiological and reproductive 
integration between the host and the bacteria is so tight that it makes sense to talk about a 
single unit, constituted by this association. 
Merging events can also happen between a virus and a host species (Pradeu, 2016). 
For example, many parasitoid wasps have integrated a polydnavirus into their genome several 
million years ago; such polydnaviruses have a beneficial effect on the parasitoid wasps: they 
enable them to realize their life cycle by laying their eggs into their hosts, where then their 
offspring grow, often killing the host progressively. In fact, the wasp eggs can survive and 
develop only because a virus integrated into the wasp’s genome actively counters the immune 
defense of the host larva ((Edson, Vinson, Stoltz, & Summers, 1981); (Espagne et al., 2004); 
(Bézier et al., 2009)). Many specialists consider that the virus has been so tightly integrated 
into the host genome that it is no longer possible to see the virus and the wasp as separate 
entities (Roossinck, 2015); on host-virus mutualisms, see also (Virgin, Wherry, & Ahmed, 
2009)). 
In many cases, therefore, symbiosis can give rise to new lineages, constituted by the 
merging of two individuals belonging to different species, and which subsequently reproduce 
as new reproductive units. The idea that symbiotic events are crucial in evolution and can 
even lead to the appearance of new species (“symbiogenesis”) is not new ((Wallin, 1927); 
(Margulis & Fester, 1991); (Margulis & Sagan, 2002)), but this phenomenon has recently 
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been illustrated by several examples, including some of those mentioned above. It seems 
legitimate, in these cases, to use the notions of heterogeneous species and heterogeneous 
lineages, on the model of the above mentioned heterogeneous organism (on this issue, see 
also (Dupré & O’Malley, 2009) and (Bouchard, 2010); more generally, on the integration of 
“foreign” genetic material, in particular through horizontal gene transfer, see (Doolittle & 
Bapteste, 2007) and (Bapteste et al., 2012)). 
 What about, now, cases of symbiotic splitting? In fact, taking into account symbioses 
is likely to lead to a very dynamic view of biological individuality, because many symbiotic 
interactions change through time. For example, humans are hosts to billions of microbes from 
birth to old age, but the composition of their microbiome changes significantly through time. 
Immediately at birth, bacteria colonize the baby, upon passage through the birth canal. The 
microbiota then has a complex history, with a first period (until approximately age 1) during 
which it has a rather simple composition (with Bifidobacteria being usually highly abundant 
in human milk-fed infants) but it also changes rapidly, and a second period during which the 
microbiota becomes highly diverse (more than 1,000 species, with a clear domination of 
Firmicutes and Bacteroidetes), indeed unique to each individual, and stabilizes (Candela, 
Biagi, Maccaferri, Turroni, & Brigidi, 2012). It is even clearer in the many cases of parasitic 
symbioses where the association is transient, for example because the parasite leaves the first 
host to colonize a second host, or because the host eliminates the parasite via its immune 
system. Importantly, even a very transient interaction between two living things can lead to 
very significant changes in their respective internal organizations, so there is no direct link 
between the robustness and durability of a symbiotic interaction and the extent to which it 
impacts the internal organization of the partners. In conclusion, the double phenomena of 
merging and splitting happen successively in many instances of symbiotic interactions, 
probably reflecting complex physiological, ecological, and evolutionary interactions between 
the two partners. 
 From all the examples examined here, it can be concluded that symbiotic events of 
merging and splitting are extremely frequent in nature, which makes Hull’s analyses and 
diagrams even more useful that they might have seemed when the paper was published in 
1978. The ubiquity of symbiosis decisively strengthens Hull’s point that genidentity is the 
best way to capture the individuality of biological entities through time. Indeed, it seems clear 
that using an essentialist account based on genetic homogeneity or an account based on 
similarity would be entirely inadequate. Only the idea of a continuous change enables us to 
follow in detail what contributes to the construction of a given living thing, and, here again, 
the criterion of the degree of disruption of internal organization seems a suitable guide to 
understand biological diachronic individuality. 
 
 
4. How the genidentity view helps define what an organism is 
 
The genidentity view seems very useful to understand biological identity. Nevertheless, it 
faces a series of important challenges, and in fact it is likely that any process-based view of 
the living world will also have to meet those challenges. The basic idea at the heart of the 
genidentity view is to follow a biological process through time. But how to choose adequately 
which processes to follow? And how to follow them in practice?  
 In my view, those questions are very important, and the answer to them will depend on 
who asks them, and for what purpose. This is where it becomes clear that one of the main 
interests of the genidentity view is that it places the emphasis on an epistemological, rather 
than ontological, approach to processes. I do not think that it is possible to prove the 
ontological claim that the biological world is “really” made of processes, and, if this is indeed 
 10 
the claim process philosophers of biology want to make, then they must give an argument for 
it. However, it is possible to give good arguments in favor of the adoption of an 
epistemological process view, and to show that, from this epistemological point of view, the 
decision to interpret the living world in terms of processes (rather than already individualized 
things) makes an important difference to the scientific work, because it leads to different 
perspectives and potentially to different experimental programs. 
 Biologists will decide which process or processes to follow according to their working 
questions. For example, one may ask how reproduction is achieved in a given species, or how 
metabolism is maintained in a cell, or how DNA transcription into RNA occurs. These 
different processes happen at different levels, and involve many different entities. What is 
crucial is to decide which process will be followed, and which criteria can help us consider 
that we are dealing with one continuous process. This is exactly the question raised by Hull, 
but he did so at a very general level, by talking about the maintaining or disruption of the 
“internal organization” of an organism or a species. In my view, Hull was definitely on the 
right track, but the notion of internal organization needs to be defined much more precisely in 
each specific biological context.  
Here I suggest to define in precise terms what internal organization and its 
maintaining/disruption mean at the level of an organism (a similar reflection can be produced, 
and is indeed produced, about the species level; see, e.g., (Haber, 2016)). More precisely, I 
suggest that immunity helps offer a more precise conception of genidentity applied to 
organisms (see also (Pradeu, 2012: 248-249)). In all species (animals, plants, and also 
prokaryotes), the immune system plays a decisive role in the delineation of the boundaries of 
the organism, because it constitutes a principle of inclusion/exclusion: the immune system is 
responsible for the rejection or tolerance of any given entity, which means that the immune 
system determines which entities will be part of the organism, and which won’t. Importantly, 
this discrimination mechanism is not based on the traditional “self” vs. “nonself” distinction, 
according to which an organism would immunologically reject all foreign entities and would 
immunologically accept only constituents originating from the organism itself. Actually, 
every organism harbors huge quantities of genetically foreign entities, and triggers everyday 
effector immune responses that target endogenous constituents.2  
More precisely, an immunological approach leads to a definition of the organism 
based on the distinction between two different levels, that of biochemical interactions, and 
that of immune interactions, both necessary to delineate the organism. From that point of 
view, an organism can be defined as follows: 
  
Def. Organism = a functionally integrated whole, made up of heterogeneous 
constituents that are locally interconnected by strong biochemical interactions, and 
controlled by systemic immune interactions. (Pradeu, 2010); (Pradeu, 2012)). 
  
This definition means that when entities interact through regular biochemical interactions and 
are actively tolerated by the continuous action of an immune system, then they are part of a 
higher-level entity that should be called an “organism.” Of course, this definition puts a strong 
emphasis on the role of the immune system in the definition of the organism, but it does so 
                                               
2 Much more specifically, the discontinuity theory of immunity that I have constructed with immunologists 
((Pradeu & Carosella, 2006a); (Pradeu, Jaeger, & Vivier, 2013)) reflects directly a genidentity perspective. 
Indeed, a crucial claim of the most elaborate versions of the genidentity view, including Reichenbach’s (see 
Guay & Pradeu, 2016b), is that what matters to understand diachronic identity is not the degree of change (does 
it change a lot?), but the rate of change (does it change rapidly?) Now, the discontinuity theory of immunity is 
exactly based on the principle that the immune system responds to sudden modifications of the antigenic motifs 
with which it interacts (for further details, see (Pradeu, 2012)). 
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based on the argument that the immune system plays a decisive role in the delineation of the 
boundaries of any organism. This definition rests on the recognition of two layers of 
interactions (biochemical interactions and immune interactions), which can be seen as a way 
to make more precise process approaches to the living world. What is suggested here is that 
there can exist some coalescences of interrelated processes, such as the organism, and that 
following such a coalescence of processes through time might rest on the identification of 
higher-level processes that control lower-level processes. Here, indeed, I suggest that an 
organism is a local concentration of intertwined biochemical processes, under the control of 
higher-level immunological processes. More generally, it is certainly crucial for a process 
philosophy to identify not only processes in general, but also “bundles” of processes (here, the 
organism), and to ask what makes the unity and cohesiveness of these “bundles” through 
time. 
 The crucial point is that, with the above definition of the organism, we do not start 
with a preexisting delineation of the organism and subsequently say that the immune system 
controls this preexisting delineation. Quite the contrary, we start with biochemical and 
immunological interactions and, from the observation of how these interactions work, we 
deduce what the boundaries of the organism are. In this view, therefore, what comes first is 
interactions, and the organism “supervenes” on those interactions. To understand this point 
fully, it is useful to move away from familiar mammalian examples, and to examine more 
complex cases of biological individuality, in particular colonial organisms. A particularly 
illuminating case is that of Botryllus schlosseri (see Figure 4). Botryllus, born as a chordate 
tadpole larva, then metamorphs into a sessile, invertebrate juvenile, after which the juvenile 
begins a lifelong, recurring budding process, resulting in a colony of expanding, asexually 
derived individuals. The colony is made of genetically identical individuals (“zooids”) united 
by a common extracorporeal vasculature. The zooids and vasculature are embedded in a 
cellulose-based tunic, and the extracorporeal vasculature ramifies throughout this matrix and 
at the periphery terminates in finger-shaped projections called “ampullae.” When two 
colonies meet, an allorecognition reaction occurs, which leads either to vascular fusion or to 
rejection. Allorecognition is controlled by a single, highly polymorphic locus (the Fu/HC), 
and the rejection is realized through the triggering of an immune response ((Scofield, 
Schlumpberger, West, & Weissman, 1982); (Nyholm et al., 2006); (McKitrick & De Tomaso, 
2010); (McKitrick, Muscat, Pierce, Bhattacharya, & De Tomaso, 2011)). 
 In the case of Botryllus schlosseri, as in many other cases of colonial organisms, it is 
very difficult to say whether what should be counted as an individual organism is each zooid, 
or the colony as a whole, or perhaps both. In fact, common sense cannot decide between those 
options. Now, according to the view presented here, it is the observation of how immune 
responses occur that tells us what should be counted as an individual organism. As illustrated 
by Figure 4, immunologically controlled fusion or rejection in Botryllus schlosseri occurs at 
the level of the whole colony, so this is the colony that must be counted as an individual 
organism according to the definition presented above. 
 
[Insert Figure 4 about here] 
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Figure 4. Rejection between two colonies of Botryllus schlosseri. 
Panel A shows an example of rejection between two colonies of Botryllus schlosseri at the level of the colonies 
themselves; the brown zones at the point of contact between the ampullae (the finger-like structures at the center 
of the image) show the starting point of the reaction of rejection. Panel B shows an example of rejection between 
two colonies of Botryllus schlosseri at the much more precise level of the ampullae. (Photographs courtesy of 
Tony De Tomaso, University of California, Santa Barbara). 
 
 The example of Botryllus illustrates one very important advantage of the approach 
presented here: we start with an indistinct, un-individualized reality, about which common 
sense and perception have little to say, and it is the decision to follow immunological 
processes that leads us to conclude, in a scientifically precise way, about what counts as an 
individual entity, and what its boundaries are. 
 
 
5. Genidentity as a way to shed light on the notion of biological process: “Priority” as 
the central question 
 
I believe that the multi-layered genidentity approach developed here can be useful to the 
current trend towards a process biology ((Dupré, 2012); (Bapteste & Dupré, 2013); (Dupré, 
2014)). 
 First, it emphasizes the importance of an epistemological approach to processes. 
Though process proponents often think in ontological terms (it is very explicit, e.g., in 
(Bapteste & Dupré, 2013)), I do not think that they have hitherto offered compelling 
arguments for this view. With an epistemological approach, the aim is, more modestly, to 
show that a process view can make a difference to the actual work of biologists, as a question 
framed in terms of which processes biologists are interested in, and how they should follow 
those processes through time. (A nice example is offered by (Dupré & Guttinger, 2016)). 
 Second, it clarifies the idea, often expressed by process philosophers, that we live in a 
world of change. According to the genidentity view, what is interesting is to study how things 
change, at which pace, and when they start and cease to exist. Within such a perspective, 
change is pervasive, and what is derivative is not change, but the apparent absence of change, 
i.e., regularities and sameness, and therefore even apparent stability must be explained in 
terms of constantly changing processes. 
 Third, and perhaps most importantly, the genidentity view shows that the crucial claim 
of a process approach is in fact a claim about priority. Indeed, a process approach does not so 
much emphasize the importance of change as such (substantialist philosophers perfectly admit 
that every substance changes constantly) as it asks which comes first between the “thing” and 
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the “process,” to which it answers that things come after processes, and derive from them. In 
other words, the important move of a processual perspective is not, in my view, to go from 
individuals to processes (by saying, for instance, that individuals are in fact processes), but 
from processes to individuals (as scientists or philosophers, we decide to follow some 
scientifically meaningful processes, and individuals supervene on these processes). This is 
exactly what I have tried to illustrate with the case of immunology: in that case, it is 
scientifically identified processes that tell us where the individual lies, and what its 
boundaries are, and not vice versa. We cannot start with the “thing” Botryllus schlosseri, 
because precisely we just don’t know where a Bottrylus schlosseri starts and ends; the only 
solution is to start with processes, namely, I suggested, biochemical and immune processes, 
and it is the realization of those processes that tells us where the individual is and what its 
boundaries are. The example of Botryllus schlosseri constitutes in fact a good model for 
thinking more generally about the individuation of living entities in other species: we cannot 
assume that we start by identifying an entity, and then ask which processes occur in that 
entity, because we cannot trust our intuitions and perceptions to identify living entities, so in 
each case (even in seemingly “intuitive” cases, such as humans) it is necessary to start with 
scientifically well-defined processes (here, immunological processes), and it is those 
processes that tell us where the individual is and what its boundaries are.  
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
The genidentity view seems particularly well suited to understand the diachronic identity of 
living things. Given the frequency of events such as extensive structural changes (e.g., 
through metamorphosis), splitting, and fusion, conceptions of biological identity based on 
similarity or substance are highly problematic. Hull (1978) had perceived this point very well, 
but we have seen that recent work on symbiosis shows that his view is probably even more 
compelling today than it was in the 1970s. So the first lesson of the present chapter is that the 
genidentity view is a very satisfying way to conceive of biological identity. 
 The second lesson of this chapter is that the genidentity view sheds an important light 
on process views in biology and philosophy of biology ((Dupré, 2012); (Bapteste & Dupré, 
2013); (Dupré, 2014)). Indeed, it emphasizes the importance of an epistemological and multi-
layered approach to processes, and it suggests that the main claim of a process view is one of 
priority, namely that processes come first and make it possible to define things, and not the 
other way around. 
 Even though the notion of genidentity has not been very popular among philosophers 
of science, there is still perhaps much we can learn from it. 
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